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THE FEDERALISM REVOLUTION
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY
Thank you so much for the incredibly kind introduction. It's truly an honor and
a pleasure to be with you again. Although I live in Los Angeles, I've come to feel
that I am very much a part of the Tenth Circuit.
I. INTRODUCTION
I have no doubt that when constitutional historians look back at the Rehnquist
Court, they will say that the greatest changes in constitutional law were with regard
to federalism. Miranda v. Arizona' wasn't overruled. 2 Abortion rights aren't going
to be eliminated. 3 School prayer isn't going to be allowed. 4 But there has been a
revolution with regard to the structure of the American government because of the
Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding federalism.
On January 20, 1981, President Ronald Reagan, in his first inaugural address,5
proclaimed a need for a new federalism, greatly limiting the powers of the federal
government and turning much governance back to the states.' Today, five Justices,
placed on the Supreme Court by Presidents Reagan and Bush,7 are dramatically
changing the nature of American government. No matter what kind of law you
practice, no matter what court you sit in, these federalism decisions are likely to
have a direct effect on you.
Debates over federalism are nothing new in American history. The very existence
of a national government came, grudgingly, only after the failure of the Articles of
Confederation. 8 Some of the most heated political battles in American history have
been over states' rights; the fight over the abolition of slavery, the Civil War itself,
the battle over the New Deal, and the fight over civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s
were all conducted with regard to federalism and states' rights.
Over the course of American history, the Supreme Court has shifted between two
different views of constitutional federalism. One view is what I would call a
nationalist vision. This approach says that the powers of the national government
should be broadly defined so as to give it the power to deal with social problems.
Under this approach, the Tenth Amendment 9 should not be interpreted as a
constraint on congressional powers. It's not for the judiciary to protect the states
under the nationalist vision. Rather, the interests of states as states can be adequately
safeguarded through the national political process.

1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
3. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
4. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
5. President's Inaugural Address, 1981 PUB. PAPERs I (Jan. 20, 1981).
6. Id. at 2 (noting his "intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the
States or to the people").
7. Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
was made Chief Justice by President Reagan.
8. Michael Les Benedict, Articlesof Confederation, in SOURCES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

20-25 (Michael Les Benedict ed., D.C. Health & Co. 1996).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it, to the States or to the people).
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The competing vision is one that I would call a federalist approach. This model
says that the powers of the national government should be limited, and that the
Tenth Amendment should be seen as a judicially-enforced limit on the powers of
Congress so as to safeguard the autonomy of state governments. Under a federalist
approach, it is the role of the federal judiciary to safeguard the states, especially with
regard to protecting state sovereign immunity.
In the first century of American history, the Court took the nationalist approach.
Though the federal government's activities were more limited than they are today,
there were many Supreme Court cases that broadly defined the scope of Congress's
powers. In Gibbons v. Ogden,"° for example, Chief Justice John Marshall
expansively defined the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, and
rejected the idea that the Tenth Amendment serves as any limit on Congress when
it is exercising its constitutionally enumerated authority.
From the 1890s to 1937, the Court shifted to a federalist vision. During this time,
the Court narrowly defined the scope of Congress's powers. For example, the Court
said that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, could only regulate the last phase
of business but could not regulate mining,2 manufacturing, or production. 3 During
this era, the Court made substantial use of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on
congressional power. When Congress passed a law prohibiting the shipment in
by child labor, the Supreme Court said it
interstate commerce of goods made
4
violated the Tenth Amendment.'
From 1937 to the 1990s, the pendulum swung back, and the Court emphatically
chose the nationalist model. From 1937 until April 26, 1995, not one federal law
was found to exceed the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. From5
1937 until 1992, only one federal law was found to violate the Tenth Amendment,
and that case was overruled less than a decade later.16 But now, as we enter the
twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has again shifted to the federalist model.
There have been three themes to what the Rehnquist Court has done with regard
to federalism. One theme is the narrowing of the scope of congressional power; the
second is the revival of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress's authority;
and the third is the great expansion of the scope of state sovereign immunity. I
would like to discuss each of these three themes, looking at what the Supreme Court
has done, particularly in the decisions of the last Term. I would also like to identify
for you the recent Tenth Circuit decisions related to these three themes.

10.

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198 (1824).

11. U.S. CONST. art 1,§ 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes).
12. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936).
13. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895); see also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1,
20-22 (1888).
14. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
116(1941).
15. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding that Congress had
impermissibly interfered with the integral functions of the states by enacting amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act that would have displaced state policies).
16. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528. 557 (1985).
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II. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
A. The Commerce Clause
The first theme, which is the limiting of the scope of Congress's power, is
manifested with regard to the Supreme Court's interpretation of two important
congressional powers; the first of these powers is Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause.
From 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court's broad definition of the commerce power
meant that Congress regularly used this authority to adopt numerous regulatory and
even criminal statutes.' 7 But in 1995 the Court decided United States v. Lopez,"
holding that the Federal Gun-Free School Zone Act was unconstitutional. This
federal law made it a crime to have a firearm within 1000 feet of a school. 9 Alfonz
Lopez, a twelfth grader in San Antonio, Texas, was convicted for violating this
law.' The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, declared the law
unconstitutional. 2' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said that it is
axiomatic under the Constitution that the powers of Congress are limited and that23
there must be restrictions on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, can
regulate in three circumstances.' First, Congress can regulate the channels of
interstate commerce, the places where commerce occurs, such as highways and26
waterways.25 Obviously, Lopez didn't involve the channels of interstate commerce.
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that Congress can regulate the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce.27 The Chief Justice pointed out that there was no requirement under the

17. See, e.g., N.LR.B.v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, which provided for union-employee collective bargaining in all industries affecting
interstate commerce, was an appropriate exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. IH, 127 (1942) (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1937, which allowed Congress to
regulate home production and use of wheat, was within Congress's Commerce Clause power, based on the
substantial effect on interstate commerce of the aggregate of such local activity); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 151-52 (1971) (holding that the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which contained a provision that extended
federal criminaljurisdiction to extortionate credit transactions, was an appropriate exercise ofCongress's Commerce
Clause authority because even purely intrastate activities may affect interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (holding that Title IIof the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited
racial discrimination by private motels which accepted out-of-state business, was within Congress's Commerce
Clause authority because the activity regulated had a real and substantial relation to the national interest and placed
a burden on interstate commerce).
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. See Federal Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)-(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
21. Id.at58O.
22. Joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
23. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (asserting that, because Congress's Commerce Clause authority is limited,
legislation passed under Congress's commerce power will always engender legal uncertainty).
24. Id. at 558.
25. Id. (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241,25657 (1964)).
26. See id. at 559.
27. Id. at 558 (citing Houston E. & W. Texas Railway Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234
U.S. 342 (1914)).
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Gun-Free School Zone Act that the gun must have traveled in interstate commerce. 28
Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist said Congress can regulate activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.29 Prior to Lopez, there were some Supreme
Court cases that said that Congress had the power to regulate wherever there was an
effect on interstate commerce.' But Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Lopez
majority, said that the test should be whether there is a "substantial effect."'" The
Court rejected the argument that guns near schools have a significant effect on
interstate commerce, so as to allow Congress to regulate.32
On May 15, 2000, the Supreme Court applied and extended Lopez in United
States v. Morrison.33 In Morrison, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act.3' The Violence
Against Women Act 35 is a comprehensive federal statute. One provision authorizes
victims of gender-motivated violence to sue. 36 The Morrisoncase involved a woman
who was allegedly raped by some football players while a freshman at Virginia Tech
University.37 The football players avoided criminal liability and, ultimately, even
escaped university discipline. 3' The student who had been raped sued the football
players and the university under the Violence Against Women Act. 39 The Supreme
Court ruled that the civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act
exceeds the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.'
Again, as in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, with
the same five-to-four split. The Chief Justice returned to the three-part Lopez test
and said that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause in any one of three
circumstances. 4 ' First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. 2
Obviously, this case didn't involve channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress can regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
involved in interstate commerce.4 3 Because the Violence Against Women Act does
not require proof that the woman or her assailant traveled in interstate commerce,

28. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
29. Id. at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,37 (1937); Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)).
30. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (holding that Congress may define a class
of activities that have an effect on interstate commerce; even purely intrastate activities may affect interstate

commerce. The Consumer Credit Protection Act's Title II provision, which extended federal criminal jurisdiction
to extortionate credit transactions, was within Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
31. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
32. Id.at 567.
33. 529 U.S. 598, 608-19 (2000).
34. 1d.at 627.
35. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 13701 (1994)).
36. See id. at § 13981(c).
37. See Morrison, 529, U.S. at 602-03.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at617-19.
41. Id. at 608-09.
42. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
43. Id. (indicating that petitioners never actually contended that the case fell within either of these first two
categories, but sought to sustain the action through the third prong of the Lopez test by arguing that the Act
regulated activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
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this doesn't apply. And third, Congress can regulate where there is a substantial
effect on interstate commerce." Here, the Morrisoncase differs from Lopez because
there were extensive congressional findings related to the economic effects of
violence against women.45 There is a voluminous legislative record documenting
that violence against women costs the American economy billions of dollars a
year. 46 The Supreme Court said that this is not enough to prove a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.47 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said that
the Violence Against Women Act does not regulate economic behavior such as
commercial transactions, but regulates conduct that has traditionally been left to
state law. 48 The Chief Justice argued that if this kind of "but-for" argument were
sufficient to allow Congress to regulate under the commerce power, there would be
49
no limit to what Congress could regulate. Morrison seems to not only reaffirm
Lopez, it appears to go even further if it says that even legislative findings of a
substantial economic effect are not enough." Where Congress is not regulating
5
commercial economic transactions, it's a matter traditionally left to the states. '
I predict, especially after Morrison,that we're going to see dozens of federal laws
challenged as exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Think
of the many firearm laws; there is a federal law that says that if a person is covered
by a restraining order in a domestic relations case, they are not allowed to have a
firearm. 52 Is this valid under the commerce power in light of53Lopez and Morrison?
There is a federal law that prevents having cloned cell phones. Is this constitutional
with regard to Lopez and Morrison?
The next case that the Supreme Court will decide with regard to the commerce
power is on the docket for next Term: The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
5
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers. 4 This case involves the
constitutionality of a federal rule that protected migratory birds in interstate flight.55
Is this within the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority? My guess is that
those migratory birds have even less effect on interstate commerce than violence
against women. And what the Court says in this case could affect many other

44. Id.
45.

Id. 614-15.

46. Id.
47. Morrison,529 U.S. at 614-15.

48. id at 617-18.
49. Id. at615.
50. See id.

51. See id. at617-18.
52. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(8) (1994) (prohibiting the sale or transfer of a firearm
to any person subject to a court order restraining them from stalking, harassing, or threatening an intimate partner
or their child, or engaging in conduct that places them in reasonable fear of bodily harm).
53. See 18 USC § 1029 (2000).
54. 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd by Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 529 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that the Migratory Bird Rule, which had extended protection to
all waters that provided a habitat to migratory birds, exceeded congressional Commerce Clause authority).
55. See id. at 848 ('This rule, or interpretive convention, reflects the fact that the definition of 'waters of the
United States' found in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) has long been understood by the EPA and the Corps to include all
waters, including those otherwise unrelated to interstate commerce, 'which are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties' or 'which are or would be used as habitat for other migratory birds which
cross state lines."') (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41,216, 41, 217 (Nov. 13, 1986)("1986 preamble")).
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environmental laws. Think of the Federal Endangered Species Act of 1973,56 which
was adopted by Congress under the Commerce Clause authority. Do endangered
species meet the Court's
recent requirement that there be a substantial effect on
5
interstate commerce? '
Recently, in United States v. Kovach,58 the Tenth Circuit addressed the
prosecution of counterfeit securities under a federal securities law.59 The defendant
argued, based on Lopez, that it exceeded the scope of Congress's power to regulate
securities in this way.' The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Briscoe, upheld
the law as constitutional.6 ' The court focused on the third part of the Lopez test,
saying that securities do have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 2 In this
case, more than $6,000 in counterfeit securities were involved. 6' But, even if it was
de minimis in this case, cumulatively, the effects of such securities across the
country are enough to constitute a substantial effect on commerce. 6 1 would think
this fits, even after the subsequent decision in Morrison, for here what's being
regulated are commercial economic activities.
B. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
The second way in which the Court has narrowed the scope of congressional
power is by limiting Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section Five authorizes Congress to adopt laws "to enforce the
' There
Fourteenth Amendment."65
have been two very important ways in which the
Court has limited Congress's Section Five power; one is a limit on what Congress
can regulate, the other is a limit on who Congress can regulate.
The decision with regard to what Congress can regulate was City of Boerne v.
Flores" in 1997. In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court
narrowly interpreted the Free Exercise Clause 68 of the Constitution.69 Congress then
passed, and President Clinton signed, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of

56. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
57. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,492 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying Morrison,the court found that, unlike
the Violence Against Women Act or the Gun Control Act, the regulation of endangered red wolves under the
Endangered Species Act was an economic activity).
58. 208 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2000).
59. See 18 U.S.C § 513(a) (1994) (making it a crime, punishable by fine and/or ten years imprisonment, for
an organization to utter or possess a forged security with intent to deceive another person, organization, or
government).
60. 208 F.3d at 1217.
61. Id at 1218.
62. Id. at 1217.
63. See id. at 1217-18.
64. See id.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
66. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power
to enact legislation that deters or remedies constitutional violations, but not the power to determine what constitutes
a constitutional violation).
67. 494 U.S. 872(1990).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from enacting any law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof).
69. See 494 U.S. at 882 (holding that the Free Exercise clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug
laws to ceremonial ingestion of peyote because the right of free exercise does not relieve the obligation of a person
to comply with valid, neutral laws of general applicability).
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1993.70 This statute restored strict scrutiny as the test to be used in determining
whether a governmental regulation violated the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause. 7' In 1997, the Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, declared the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional.72 Justice Kennedy, who wrote
the majority opinion, said that when Congress acts under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot expand the scope of rights or create new rights.
courts, or adopt laws to
Congress is authorized to remedy rights recognized by the
74 The Court said that any
courts.
the
by
recognized
prevent the violation of rights
such remedial statute has to be proportionate to the problem that exists, as found by
Congress." The Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was an
expansion of rights.76 Because the Court viewed it as creating new rights, it declared
this statute unconstitutional.' Justice Kennedy said that there was not evidence
before Congress of a pattern of violation of free exercise of religion by state and
local governments that would make this act proportionate in preventing violations
of rights as a needed remedy.78
The other way in which the Supreme Court has narrowed Congress's Section Five
of the Fourteenth
power concerns who Congress can regulate under Section Five
79 the other argument s°
Morrison,
v.
States
United
in
2000,
15,
Amendment. On May
that the United States Government made to the Supreme Court was that the civil
damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act was constitutional because
8
Congress could adopt it pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. '
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that the Act was not a
constitutional exercise of Congress's Section Five power.2 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, said that Congress, under Section Five of the8 3Fourteenth
Amendment, may only regulate state and local government behavior. Congress
cannot regulate private conduct, even on a finding that state and local regulation was
inadequate."
In 1883, in The Civil Rights Cases, s the Supreme Court said that Congress, under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, could only regulate state and local
86
government behavior, not private conduct. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 which

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb etseq. (1993).
See id
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
ld. at 527-29.
Id. at 518-25.
Id. at 520, 530.
Id. at 532.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
Id. at 532.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
See supra text accompanying notes 33-51 (discussing whether the Violence Against Women Act was

a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority).
81. 529 U.S. 619.
82. Id. at 627.
83. Id. at621.
84. Id.

85. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
86. Id. at 11.

87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
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prohibits racial discrimination by hotels and restaurants and employment
discrimination by private employers, was adopted by Congress under its Commerce
Clause authority88 because of fears that The Civil Rights Cases89 might still be good
law. Since 1964, however, the Supreme Court has, in many cases, indicated that
Congress, under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, could regulate private
conduct. In United States v. Guest," five Justices agreed that Congress, under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, could regulate private conduct.9' In
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic92 in 1992, a majority of the Court cited
approvingly to United States v. Guest,93 seemingly treating it as if it were the law.'
But in United States v. Morrison," Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
indicated that these cases are not the law; The Civil Rights Cases are still
controlling." Congress can't regulate private behavior under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
This seems to me to open the door for challenges to many federal laws. For
example, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 authorizes a civil cause of action against private actors
involved in a conspiracy to violate civil rights.9" It's always been thought that
section 1985 was adopted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Does
that make it unconstitutional? Consider also the freedom of access to clinic
entrances, a federal law adopted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which protects access to abortion clinics. 99 Since it regulates private behavior, is it
then unconstitutional?
In the last three years, the Court has narrowed Congress's Section Five power
dramatically by limiting what Congress can regulate, and also by limiting who
Congress can regulate.
Ill. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AS A LIMIT
ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER
As I mentioned earlier, there are three themes to what the Rehnquist Court has
done with regard to federalism. One of these themes is the narrowing of the scope
of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, and under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The second theme is the revival of the Tenth Amendment
as a limit on Congress's authority.

88. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964).
89. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
90. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
91. See id. at 759.
92. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
93. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
94. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 297, n.7.
95. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
96. See id. at 621.
97. See id.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (1994).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) (providing for civil remedy for damages where two or more persons
conspire on the premises of another for the purposes of depriving any person or class of persons equal protection
of the laws or of equal privilege and immunities under the law).
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The Tenth Amendment says that all powers not delegated to the United States,
t
nor prohibited by it, are reserved to the states or to the people respectively. In
Gibbons v. Ogden,' Chief Justice John Marshall viewed the Tenth Amendment as
2
a reminder for Congress to point to its authority in the Constitution.'° Under this
0 3 In the first third
view, there is no Tenth Amendment limit on Congress's power.'
of the twentieth century, until 1937, the Court indicated that the Tenth Amendment
was the provision that reserved a zone of activities for the states. From 1937 until
1992, there was only one case that found a federal law to violate the Tenth
°4
Amendment: NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery in 1976. That case was 0overruled
5
in 1985 by Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransportationDistrict.'
have
There
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court has revived the Tenth Amendment.
of
first
been three Supreme Court decisions related to the Tenth Amendment. The
° in 1992. This case involved the Low-Level
these was New York v. United States"
Radioactive Waste Disposal Policy Act of 1985,107 a federal law that required the
states to clean up their nuclear waste by 1986. Any state that failed to do so would
then be deemed to be responsible for the nuclear waste and would be liable for any
harms it had caused.' °8 The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, declared this
unconstitutional."° Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, said that Congress, in
this Act, is conscripting state and local governments by forcing the states to enact
0
laws or to adopt regulations to clean up nuclear waste." The Court said it violates
the Tenth Amendment for Congress to compel such state legislative or regulatory
behavior. " '
The Supreme Court followed and extended New York v. United States'2 in Printz
v. United States"3 in 1997. Printz involved the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act,"' a federal law that required state and local law enforcement personnel to do
background checks before issuing permits for firearms. The Supreme Court, in a
five-to-four decision, declared the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
unconstitutional." 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Printz, said here, too,

100. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
101. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
102. See id. at 198.
103. See generally id.
104. 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976).
105. 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
106. 505 U.S. 144(1992).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 5(d)(2)(C), amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (d)(1) (1994).
108. See id.
109. New York, 505 U.S. at 177, 186 (having decided that the "take title provision" of the Act was
unconstitutional, the Court went on to hold that this provision could be severed without doing violence to the rest
of the Act).
110. Id. at 175-76 (noting that the "take title" provision of the Act and the provision that would require the
state to become liable for generator's damages would commandeer state governments for the service of a federal
regulatory scheme, while the other alternative, regulating pursuant to Congress's direction, would simply represent
a command to states to implement legislation enacted by Congress).
111. Id. at 174-77.
112. 505 U.S. 144.
113. See 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 & Supp. IV. 1998).
115. 521 U.S. at 933-35 (finding the provisions of the Act that required state officials to conduct background
checks unconstitutional. The Court did not resolve questions regarding provisions of the Act affecting firearm
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Congress is conscripting state and local governments by forcing the state and local
governments to administer a federal program to carry out a congressional
mandate." 6 Furthermore, this Act did not provide federal funding for the
administration of such a program.' l7 The Court said it violates the Tenth
Amendment for Congress to conscript state and local governments in this manner." 8
I just want to pause for a moment and reflect on the cases that I've talked about
in the last few years. Think about what Congress was regulating in these cases: guns
within 1000 feet of schools," 9 violence against women,'"c cleaning up low level
nuclear waste,12 requiring background checks for handguns.' 2 All of these are
unquestionably desirable federal laws in terms of their merits. These are all,
unquestionably, popular federal laws. Notice, however, that the Supreme Court's
federalism jurisprudence found them unconstitutional,' 3 either exceeding
Congress's power or as violating the Tenth Amendment.
There was one Tenth Amendment decision from this Term that indicates that
there is some limit to how far the Court is going to go in extending the reach of the
Tenth Amendment as a constraint on Congress; the case, Reno v. Condon,'24
involved the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act."2 This is a federal law that
says that states' Departments of Motor Vehicles cannot release personal information
about people, like their home addresses or their Social Security numbers.' 26 This bill
was introduced into Congress by California Senator Barbara Boxer after an actress
in Los Angeles, Rebecca Schaefer, was stalked and murdered by a man who got her
home address from the California Department of Motor Vehicles.' 27 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared the law unconstitutional as
violating the Tenth Amendment.2' The Fourth Circuit said that through this Act

dealers and purchasers.).
116. Id. at935.
117. See 18U.S.C. §922.
118. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (holding the Act "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system
of dual sovereignty").
119. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 922 (q)(l)-(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
120. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 13701 (1994)).

121. See The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5(d)(2XC), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2021 (e)(2)(A) (1994).
122. See The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922.
123. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of congressional commerce power); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 627 (2000) (holding that the civil cause of action provision of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and, under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress may not regulate private activity); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177, 186 (1992) (holding
that The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act is unconstitutional as in impermissible conscription of state
governments in violation of the Tenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that

the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which requires state and local law enforcement personnel to conduct
background checks before issuing permits for firearms, violates the Tenth Amendment).
124. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
125. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994 & Supp. MI).

126. See generally id.
127. See 179 CONG. REC. S15794 (Nov. 16, 1993).
128. 155 F.3d 453, 463 (4th Cir. 1998).
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29
Congress is regulating state governments, which violates state sovereignty.' The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fourth Circuit.' It's nice to see a circuit
other than the Ninth Circuit getting unanimously reversed. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing the opinion for the Court, explained that the states were engaging in
commercial behavior by selling the DMV lists. '3 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that
132
Congress, under the Commerce Clause, may regulate such commercial behavior.
The Chief Justice distinguished New York v. United States 33 and Printz v. United
1 35
States"3 because in those cases Congress was compelling state and local behavior.
In the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, Congress is prohibiting state and local
governments from acting a certain way.' 36 Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that
this isn't a law that targets only the state and local governments.137 There are aspects
it is
of the law that also regulate private entities that have DMV information; thus,
38
Amendment.
Tenth
the
of
limits
the
escapes
that
law
a more comprehensive
Here is a key question with regard to the Tenth Amendment that's going to be
litigated throughout the country. To what extent does Congress induce or, depending
upon your perspective, coerce state and local behavior by putting strings on grants?
The last Supreme Court case to address this was South Dakota v. Dole139 in 1987.
Congress passed legislation requiring the states to set a twenty-one-year-old
drinking age in order to receive federal highway funds."4° Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority in Dole, upheld the constitutionality of this legislation.' 4'
The Supreme Court said that Congress may put conditions on grants, so long as the
conditions are expressly stated and so long as the conditions relate to the purpose
of the spending program. 4 2 South Dakota v. Dole4 3 was, however, decided in 1987,
before the recent federalism and the recent Tenth Amendment cases.'" Might the
Supreme Court reconsider whether Congress may conscript the states by placing
strings on grants?
There is a very recent Tenth Circuit case on point now, one of the leading cases
in the country on the issue. The case is Kansas v. United States, 45 decided on June

129. Id.
130. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000).
131.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
uniformity
142.

Id. at 148.

Id.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Reno, 528 U.S. at 149.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 149-51.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 & Supp. IV. 1998).
Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (holding that Congress, acting under its spending power by encouraging
in state drinking ages, was within the scope of its constitutional authority).
Id. at 208-09 (finding that the conditions set forth by Congress were clearly stated and directly related

to one of the main purposes of highway funding: safe interstate travel).
143. 483 U.S. 203.
144. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that the Brady Handgun Control Act
violates the Tenth Amendment; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177, 186 (1992) (holding that The Low-

Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Act impermissibly conscripts state governments in violation of the Tenth
Amendment).
145. 214F.3d l196(10thCir.2000).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31

1, 2000. This case involved the federal welfare program, specifically the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families Program, that came into existence as part of the
Welfare Reform Law of 1996.46 As a condition for states receiving money under
this program, they have to take into account certain conduct, especially with regard
to child support enforcement." 7 The State of Kansas argued that it was a violation
of the Tenth Amendment for the federal government to force it to take actions, even
as a condition for receiving federal money."4 The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by
Chief Judge Seymour, upheld the constitutionality of this federal law. 149 The Tenth
Circuit, citing South Dakota v. Dole,15° said that Congress can put strings on grants
so long as the terms are clearly stated and the conditions relate to the purpose of the
program. 15 1 The Tenth Circuit found that the conditions for receiving this funding
were clearly stated.5 2 The Tenth
Circuit also found that these conditions related to
53
the purpose of the program.

Assuming that other circuits follow this pattern, and that the Supreme Court
agrees, we may be seeing Congress trying to achieve through the spending program
what it's not going to be able to achieve through the commerce power or through
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. State Sovereign Immunity in State Court
The third theme with regard to federalism has been the dramatic expansion of the
scope of state sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has done this with regard to
suits against states in state court, and with regard to suits against states in federal
court. First, I will address suits against states in state court. Alden v. Maine,'1 4 one
of the most important of all of these federalism cases, was decided on June 23, 1999.
The facts of the case were simple; probation officers in the State of Maine claimed
that they were owed overtime pay by the State. 55 They sued the State in federal
court, and the federal court said that the case was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. 5 6 So the probation officers sued the State of Maine in Maine state
court,

57

since state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in these suits under the

146. Formerly known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
147. See Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1197.
148. See id. at 1198.
149. 11. at 1204.
150. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
151. Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1199.
152. Id. (concluding that, although Kansas asserted that some of the conditions were vague, it failed to assert
any alleged ambiguity that would interfere with its ability to accept the funds "knowingly" and "cognizant of the
consequences.. .of participation," as required by Dole).
153. Id. at 1200, 1204.
154. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
155. Id. at7il.
156. Id. at 712 (citing Seminole Indian Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,64 (1996) (holding that, under
the Eleventh Amendment, state sovereign immunity limits the jurisdiction of federal courts)).
157. lI.

Winter 2001 ]

THE FEDERALISM REVOLUTION

Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.' 8 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled that
the State of Maine had sovereign immunity and held that the State couldn't be sued
in its own state courts without its consent. 59 The United States Supreme Court, in
another five-to-four decision, affirmed the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. " Justice
Kennedy, who wrote the opinion for the Court, acknowledged at the outset that there
is no provision in the text of the Constitution that deals with suing states in state
court."6' The Eleventh Amendment deals only with whether suit may be brought in
federal court. 6 ' Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that the framers were silent, in
Philadelphia and in the state ratifying conventions, about whether states could be
sued in state court. 63 The silence of the framers, according to Justice Kennedy,
64
indicates that they thought it impossible to sue a state without the state's consent.
Justice Kennedy said it's unthinkable that states are restricted by the Constitution,
ought to allow themselves to be sued in their own courts without
or that they
65
consent.
I think this case is enormously important. In part, it's significant because of the
Court's approval of broad preclusion of all judicial jurisdiction.' 66 The probation
officers in Maine unquestionably have a federal right to overtime pay. 167 But they
can't sue in federal court and they can't sue in state court, 6 8 although they might be
able to sue the state officers for injunctive relief in the future. The United States
Government, if it wanted to, could sue the State of Maine. But the probation
officers, themselves, have nowhere that they can sue. I think the case is also very
important for what it says in terms of holding state governments accountable.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, 69 the Solicitor General of the United
States, Seth Waxman, quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause of Article
XI70 "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.' 17 ' Waxman
asked, "How can we assure the supremacy of law unless there is a judicial forum
available?"' 72 Justice Kennedy devoted an entire section in Alden to addressing this
argument. 73 1want to quote Justice Kennedy; it's such remarkable language. Justice
Kennedy wrote,

158. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
159. Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 174 (Me. 1998).

160. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 760.
161.

162.
suit in law
citizens or
163.

Id. at 750.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by
subjects of any foreign State.").
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 743.

164. Id. at 741-43.
165. Seeid. at743.
166. See id. at 712.
167. See The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (1994 & Supp. 111).

168. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 712; Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 55 (lst Cir. 1997).
169. 1999 U.S. Trans. Lexis 1.
170. Seeid. at 1l.
171. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
172. 199 U.S. Briefs 436, 14.

173. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55.
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[t]he constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in its

own courts does not confer on the State a concomitant right to disregard the
Constitution or valid federal law....We are unwilling to assume that the States
will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States. The good faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that
"[the] Constitution, and Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law of the Land.' 7 4
So what's the assurance that the states will comply with federal law, trust in the
good faith of state governments? Can you imagine what would have happened,
twenty or thirty years ago at the height of the civil rights movement, if the Supreme
Court had said, "no need to review what the state courts are doing with
desegregation; we'll trust them"? James Madison said that if people were angels,
there would be no need for a constitution. 17 But there would be no need for a
government either. Whether you're a judge or a practitioner, you know that state and
local governments, whether intentionally or unintentionally, do sometimes violate
federal law. And yet, the Supreme Court says we can put our trust in the good faith
of state governments. 76
B. The Eleventh Amendment
The other aspect of the expansion of sovereign immunity has been related to
whether States may be sued in federal court. The Eleventh Amendment says that the
judicial power of the United States shall not extend to a suit against the state brought
by citizens of another state or citizens of a foreign country.'" In 1890, in Hans v.
Louisiana,7 8 the Supreme Court said that states can't be sued by their own citizens
in federal court. 9 The Supreme Court said it would have been anomalous to allow
a state to be sued by its own citizens when it can't be sued by out of state parties. "'
Over the course of the twentieth century, three ways of getting around the
Eleventh Amendment, and holding state governments accountable, have been
developed. There have been important Supreme Court cases in the last few years
addressing each of these methods.
1. Congressional Power to Authorize Suits against States
In 1976, in Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer,' 8' the Supreme Court said that when Congress
acts under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, it can override the Eleventh
Amendment and authorize suits against state governments.8 2 Fitzpatrickinvolved
a suit against the State of Connecticut for violating Title VII with regard to

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55.
U.S. CoNs']. amend. XI.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Id. at21.
Id. at 15-16.
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Id. at 456.
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employment discrimination.' 3 The Supreme Court said Congress applied Title VII
to the States, pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 84 Justice
Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion in Fitzpatrick, said that the Fourteenth
Amendment can modify the Eleventh Amendment because it was ratified after the
Eleventh Amendment." 5 Moreover, the Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment
was meant to place limits on state power.s Accordingly, Congress, under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, can override a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity.'8 7
In 1989, in Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas,"88 the Supreme Court said Congress can
override the Eleventh Amendment by using any of its constitutional powers, so long
as the text of the law is clear in doing so.' 8 9 Union Gas involved a federal
environmental statute.'19 But in 1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,9' the Supreme
Court overruled Union Gas.,92 You might wonder what happened in those seven
years. Is it that somebody found a musty copy of the Eleventh Amendment that
showed the Supreme Court had gone wrong in Union Gas?93 Was it that Union Gas
had proved impractical as it was administered? The simple, and I think
uncontroverted, explanation is the change in the composition of the Supreme Court.
Union Gas was a five-to-four decision.' 9 Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the
Court, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, White, and Stevens. Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented. Between 1989 and 1996,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White all left the Court. The four
dissenters remained on the Court and were joined by Justice Thomas, who gave
them the fifth vote to overrule Union Gas.195
Seminole Tribe v. Florida'" dealt with the Federal Indian Gaming Act.197 The
federal law required that Indian tribes be able to negotiate in good faith with state
governments to allow gambling on Native American reservations.'9 The law created
an unquestionable duty for state governments to negotiate in good faith with Indian
tribes, and it was alleged that the State of Florida did not do so.' 99 The law
specifically authorized the suit against the State in federal court.' Chief Justice

183. See id at445.
184. Id. at 447.
185. See id. at 456-57.
186. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456.
187. Id.
188. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
189. See id. at 7.
190. See id. (holding that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), expresses
an intent to permit states to be held liable for damages in federal courts and that Congress has the constitutional
authority to override state Eleventh Amendment immunity in this regard).
191. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
192. Id. at66.
193. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
194. See generally id
195. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 66.
196. Id.
197. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3)(A).
198. Id.
199. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 52.
200. 25 U.S.C. 2710 § (d)(7).
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Rehnquist, writing for the Court in a five-to-four decision, held that Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas was to be overruled. 20 ' The Supreme Court said that Union Gas was
not in accord with long-standing precedents of the Supreme Court and gave
Congress too much authority to authorize suits against state governments. 202 In
Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court said Congress can authorize suits against states
only when Congress is acting under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, not
when Congress is using any other power, like the Commerce Clause. 23 This is
where the cases that I was talking about earlier, with regard to Congress's power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, become particularly important.
The Supreme Court, in cases like City ofBoerne v. Flores,2'° has narrowed the scope
of Congress's authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue
now becomes whether a law is a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which case a state can be sued for violating
the law.
There have been two Supreme Court cases in just the last year dealing with this
issue. One that came down a year ago, on June 23, 1999, was FloridaPrepaid v.
College Savings Bank.205 College Savings Bank is a New Jersey company that
devised a system allowing people to set aside money to pay later for college and
university education. 2' Florida Prepaid is an agency of the State of Florida that
copied that system and allowed students to use the system to set aside money to pay
for their education at Florida colleges and universities. 7 It turned out that Florida
Prepaid was violating a patent by copying the prepayment system devised by
College Savings Bank.' After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,2° Congress had
amended the patent laws to specifically say that states could be sued for patent or
other intellectual property violations.2 0 The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, held that state governments cannot be sued for patent violations in federal
court. 21 ' The issue, of course, was whether the law authorizing suits against the
2' 2
states for patent violation was a valid exercise of Congress's Section Five power.
The Supreme Court went back to City ofBoerne v. Flores?'3 and said, in light of that
decision, that Congress cannot create new rights or expand the scope of rights. 2 4
Congress can only provide remedies to prevent the violation of existing rights, and
these remedies must be in proportion to the nature of the violation." 5 The Supreme

201. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 66.
202. id.
203. Id. at 65.
204. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which sought to
enforce the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, exceeded Congress's Section Five power, contradicting vital
principles necessary to maintain the separation of powers).
205. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
206. See id. at 630.
207. See id. at 631.
208. See id.
209. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
210. See 106 Stat. 3567 § 43 (a).
211. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
212. Seeid. at653-54.
213. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
214. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 638.
215. See id.
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Court said that because there was no proof before Congress of a widespread practice
of state governments violating patents or intellectual property, this law was not
Section Five power." 6 Therefore,
remedial, but exceeded the scope of Congress's
217
violations.
patent
for
sued
states can't be
Imagine a state laboratory that violates somebody's patents. Imagine that a state
government, being short of money, decides to make as many copies of Windows
2000 as they can and sell them before a suit for injunctive relief can be brought.
There is no place in which the victim can sue the state for money damages. They can
sue the state officer for injunctive relief, and if they can overcome the officer's
individual immunity, they may get money from the officer's pocket. But they can't
sue the state in state court according to Alden v. Maine."' Besides, federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over intellectual property. 219 And a state can't be sued
in federal court because that's the holding of Florida Prepaid.'° This is a
tremendous expansion of state immunity in an area that can cost private investors
in private companies millions of dollars or more.
On January 11, 2000, the Supreme Court followed and extended this expansion
of state immunity in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents. 221 Kimel involved the
question of whether state governments can be sued for violating the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.' Again, the Court addressed the same issue.
If the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is a valid exercise of Congress's
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment then a state government
can be sued for violating it.' If it's not valid under Section Five, then a state
government can't be sued in federal court for violating the Act.2' The Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that state governments cannot be sued for
violating the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.' Justice O'Connor
wrote the majority opinion for the Court, with the same split among the Justices.'
Justice O'Connor, at the beginning of her opinion, acknowledged that the Supreme
Court in E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming227 had said that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. Congress, however, cannot authorize suits against states when it acts under
the Commerce Clause.mn When asking whether a state can be sued, the question is

216. Seeid at630.
217. See id.
218. See Alden, 527 U.S. 754 (1999).
219. See 28 U.S.C. 1338 (a).
220. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
221. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
222. See id at 66-67; 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1990).
223. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.
224. I
225. Id.at 91.
226. Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas on Parts I, fl, and IV
of the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor was joined, on Part 11, by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Stevens filed an opinion, dissenting in part and concurring in part, in which he was
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy. filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
227. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
228. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may override state
sovereign immunity only when acting pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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whether it is valid under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 229 The Court

went back to City of Boerne230 and FloridaPrepaid23' and said that Congress can

only act to remedy violations of rights or prevent violations of rights. 23
Furthermore, these remedial actions have to be in proportion to the violation.
Congress can't expand the scope of rights. 4 Justice O'Connor said age
discrimination receives only rational basis review under equal protection.? 5 The
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits much that would not
violate the Constitution." Moreover, in terms of whether this act was necessary to
prevent state violations, Justice O'Connor said that there was little evidence before
Congress, when they adopted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, of a
pattern of state age discrimination, so this can't be said to be proportionate to the
nature of the violations. 7 Of course, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 238
was adopted before City of Boerne 9 and Seminole Tribe.2 ° Congress didn't know

then that it needed to document a pattern of violation of rights. But the Supreme
Court said that without that kind of documentation, it can't be said that the remedy
is proportionate to the pattern of violation of rights.24 So the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act exceeds2 2the scope of Congress's power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In light of these cases, you can immediately see that many federal laws will be
challenged with the argument that they weren't valid under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that states can't be sued for violating these laws. What
about the Family and Medical Leave Act; 3 can a state be sued for violating that?
What about the Rehabilitation Act?' Or what about the act that's now before the
Supreme Court, the Americans With Disabilities Act?2"
Twice this past Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in cases involving
whether or not states could be sued for violating the Americans With Disabilities
Act, but both of those cases settled while on the Supreme Court's docket.' Not to

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See id
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
See id. (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518).
See id.

235. See id. at 83-84 (explaining that, because age is not a suspect class and such classification is
presumptively rational, the individual challenging the constitutionality of such a classification bears the burden of
proving that the government had no rational basis for its actions).
236. See id. at 86.
237. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-89.

238. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1990).
239. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

240. 517 U.S. 44(1996).
241. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83.
242. Id. at 91.
243. 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (1993).

244. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-97 (1973).
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (1990).

246. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1007-10 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part,
Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000), dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000) (holding that extension of ADA Title
[1to the States is not a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
disagreeing with decisions in the Eleventh, Fifth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits). Alsbrook, which has been settled,
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be frustrated, the Supreme Court granted cert in a case for next year that involves
the same issue: University of Alabama v. Garrett.24' And again, the same question,

Can the Americans With Disabilities Act be seen as a valid exercise of Congress's
2
power under Section Five, so that state governments could be sued for violations? "
The Americans with Disabilities Act249 has a far more elaborate legislative record,
including the documentation of state and local violations. So we'll see what kind of
record is enough.
There is a Tenth Circuit case, Martin v. KansasY where the Tenth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Ebel, found that the Americans With Disabilities Act is a valid
exercise of Congress's power under Section Five and does override the Eleventh
Amendment.

2. Waiver
It's a bit strange; the Supreme Court has frequently spoken of the Eleventh
Amendment as if there were a restriction on federal court subject matter
jurisdiction. 2" And we all know that the basic rule is that subject matter jurisdiction
can't be gained by consent. 2 But the Eleventh Amendment is different. Even in
Hans v. Louisiana, 53 in 1890, the Supreme Court said that states can waive their
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The question then becomes, What's enough to
constitute a waiver by state government? There have been many Supreme Court
cases about this. 254
The most recent, a decision from last Term, was College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid.5 This case involves, instead of a patent claim,7' a Lanham Act claim for
deceptive business practices. 27 When Congress amended the intellectual property
laws, it also changed the trademark laws to say that states could be sued in federal
court for Lanham Act violations. 258 The attorneys for College Bank said that the
State of Florida, having made the voluntary choice to engage in this behavior,

was to be consolidated with Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Dickson, 528 U.S. 1132, dismissed, 528 U.S. 1184
(2000) (presenting the question of whether the ADA is a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
U.S.-.., 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (holding
247. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, that state governments may not be properly sued under Title I of the ADA because such suits are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment).
248. See id
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (1990).
250. 190 F.3d 1120, 1126(10th 1999).
251. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,267 (1997).
252. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975).
253. 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890); See also, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURisDICTtON 399 (Aspen Law &
Business, 3d. ed. 1999).
254. See, e.g., Port Author. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1990); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S.
513, 531 (1936).
255. 527 U.S. 666(1999).
256. See Florida Prepaid v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (although involving the same parties as
College Say. Bank, this case involved a claim against a State for violating The Patent and Plant Protection Remedy
Clarification Act, rather than a Lanham Act claim, as in College Say. Bank).
257. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 669.
258. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (2) (1992).
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waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and, therefore, could be sued.2 19 Is this
sufficient to constitute a waiver? The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, said there is no doctrine of implied or constructive waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment.2 6 Any waiver by the State must be explicit and expressed. 26 1
The question that some of you will have to decide as judges, and some of you
must litigate as lawyers, is who in the state has the authority to waive a state's
sovereign immunity, and what kind of conduct by the state government is enough
to constitute such a waiver? The Tenth Circuit is the leader, I think, across the
country in being willing to find waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity; three
recent Tenth Circuit cases are widely cited with regard to waiver. 6 2
The first of these cases is Innes v. Kansas State University,263 often referred to as
In Re. Innes because it comes out of the bankruptcy context. In essence, it involves
the ability to bring a proceeding against a state to discharge a student loan obligation
as part of bankruptcy proceedings.2 Generally, student loans are not dischargeable
in bankruptcy, but on specific findings they can be discharged. 5 The question here
was whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the State to order such a
discharge of the debt.' The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge McKay, found
that the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily
choosing to participate in the federal student loan program; thus the discharge was
permissible.26 7 The State of Kansas had entered into contracts with the federal
Department of Education." The Tenth Circuit said that, by voluntarily choosing to
enter that program and agreeing to that contract, the State had also agreed to the
other terms of the contract, including the circumstances under which student loans
can be discharged in bankruptcy.269 There is now a conflict among the circuits; most
of the circuits have ruled in agreement with the Tenth Circuit, but some circuits
disagree.27 So it's likely to go on to the Supreme Court.
Utah School for the Deaf and Blind v. Sutton,271' another Tenth Circuit case,
involved the question of whether the state government had waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by choosing to remove a case from state to federal court.2 2
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided a case called Wisconsin Department of
Correctionsv. Schacht. 3 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he
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271. 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999).
272. See id. at 1234, 1236 (holding that the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing
a case from state court to federal court).
273. 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
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suggested that a choice by the State to remove a case from state to federal court
would be enough for a waiver.27 The Tenth Circuit, citing expressly to language
from Justice Kennedy, found that the State's decision to remove from state to federal
court was a waiver. 7" But here's the underlying heart of the issue, Can a state
attorney general's office, by removing, waive the state sovereign immunity, or can
only the state legislature waive the state sovereign immunity? When it comes to
276
federal sovereign immunity, only Congress can waive that. Is this true with regard
to the states, or can others in the state waive the state's immunity? And if so, by
doing what?
The most recent case from the Tenth Circuit was MCI Telecommunications
Corporation v. PSC of Utah, which was decided on June 20, 2 0 0 0 .2'l This case
involved a claim against the State of Utah, specifically against the Utah Public
Service Commission.2 78 The argument was made that under the Federal
Telecommunications Act 279 the Utah Public Service Commission, in choosing to
arbitrate a dispute among private parties, had waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity and consented to suit in federal court.' The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion
by Judge Tacha, found that there was effective waiver because the Commission had
made the voluntary choice, under the act, to serve as an arbitrator of this private
dispute, and that under the terms of the law, that's enough for a waiver." There has
been very little guidance from the Supreme Court as to what behavior by a state is
enough to constitute a waiver; the leader in clarifying under what circumstances
there can be a waiver is really the Tenth Circuit.
As I said, there are three ways around the Eleventh Amendment. One way is
when a federal law is adopted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Another way is waiver. And third, practically speaking probably the most important,
is the ability to sue state officers.
3. Suits against Individual Officers
In Ex Parte Young,282 in 1908, the Supreme Court held that state officers can be
sued in federal court, even though state governments cannot be sued in federal
court. 28 3 And so, ever since Ex Parte Young, if a plaintiff wants to enjoin a state
government from doing something, the plaintiff simply names state officers as
defendants and gets an injunction against the state officers. The Supreme Court
28
frequently has said that Ex ParteYoung creates a fiction. Ex Parte Young said that
state officers alleged to violate federal law are stripped of state authority, and of
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Eleventh Amendment immunity, but are still considered to be state actors for other
constitutional purposes. 5
The Supreme Court, in the last few years, has also narrowed the ability to sue
state officers, although less dramatically, I think, than it has narrowed the other ways
around the Eleventh Amendment. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,8 6 in addition to the
suit against the State of Florida to enforce the Federal Indian Gaming Act, there was
also a suit against Florida officials under the Federal Indian Gaming Act, which
would seem to fit under Ex Parte Young.2 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
created a new exception to Ex Parte Young; a suit can't be brought under Ex Parte
Young, against the state officers, to enforce federal laws that create and contain
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. 8 8 So you can't bring a suit against the
state officer to enforce a federal law if that federal law has a comprehensive
enforcement mechanism. 2 9 The obvious question is what's enough to make a federal
law have a comprehensive enforcement mechanism? There is nothing in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion that gives any guidance.' What's puzzling is what the
mechanism was in the federal Indian Gaming Act 9' that was enough to preclude a
suit against state officers. The primary enforcement mechanism was the ability to
sue state governments, which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in the first
half of its opinion. 29 Surely that can't be enough to be a comprehensive
enforcement mechanism. There is very little guidance, even from the other courts,
regarding under what circumstances Ex Parte Young suits are precluded because the
federal statute creates or contains a comprehensive enforcement mechanism.
The other limit on Ex Parte Young suits, which I think is more narrow, comes
from a case called Idaho v. Coeurd'Alene Tribe ofldaho.293 This was a suit brought
by a Native American Tribe in Idaho to quiet title to submerged land. 2' The suit
named the State as a defendant; this was, of course, barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.'" But the Tribe also sued state officers as defendants. 2 The Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that the suit against the state officers was
barred.29 The Supreme Court said that states have a unique sovereign interest with
regard to their submerged land.298 Therefore, because of this unique sovereign
interest, the action to quiet title couldn't be brought against the officers. 29 In other
words, there is a new exception to Ex Parte Young in situations where a state has a
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special sovereign interest.' Two things about the case are notable. One is the Court
doesn't give any guidance as to what's enough to make a unique sovereign interest.
The Court says there is a unique sovereign interest on an action for quiet title to
submerged land,30' but what else would be we don't know.
The other thing that I think is very notable about the case is that Justice Kennedy
wrote an opinion, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that essentially called for
the overruling of Ex Parte Young.302 Justice Kennedy said that Ex Parte Young is a
fiction and that we should only indulge this fiction in two circumsiances: when there
30 3
is a special federal interest or when it's proven that state remedies are inadequate.
My guess is that, had the majority of the Court adopted this view, there would be
relatively few instances in which either of those circumstances would be found to
be present, and all full litigation against state government, via Er Parte Young,
would have been shifted to the states. I have often been curious as to why Justices
Scalia and Thomas did not go along with Justice Kennedy's opinion; they are the
foremost advocates of states' rights on the Court, yet they didn't go along with
Justice Kennedy's opinion. My own guess, and it's just a surmise, is that it was
because Justice Scalia, who has said he likes bright line rules of constitutional law,
doesn't like ad hoc balancing. 3°1 Justice Kennedy was calling for case-by-case
balancing, suits against state officers being allowed only if one of these factors is
3 °5
proved to be present in the particular case. I wonder whether Justices Scalia and
Thomas might be willing to go for a much more radical overruling of Ex Parte
who would
Young, rather than a case-by-case approach. However, Justice O'Connor,
3' Refusing to go
Young.
Parte
Ex
of
defense
be the necessary fifth vote, wrote in
as far as some of the other conservative members of the Court, she defended Ex
Parte Young as a mainstay of state compliance with federal law in the
Constitution.'
30
of
There is one Tenth Circuit case, J.B. v. Valdez, ' that deals with the issue
30 9 J.B.
Tribe.
d'Alene
Coeur
v.
Idaho
applying
by
interest
sovereign
what's a unique
v. Valdez was a suit by developmentally disabled children against the State, arguing
3
that services should be provided to them. "' The State, having clever lawyers who
read the United States Reports, essentially said, "We'll invoke Idaho v. Coeur
'
d'Alene; there are special state interests here, like allocating educational funds."
3 12 The
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Tacha, rejected that argument.
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Tenth Circuit said that this is a state program; there are31 3not the unique kind of state
interests that were present in Idaho v. Coeurd'Alene.
V. CONCLUSION
So that's an overview of what the Rehnquist Court has done with regard to
federalism in the last decade. Striking, to me, is the fact that every Supreme Court
case that I've focused on is from 1992 or later. In fact, except for New York v.
UnitedStates,31 4 which was decided in 1992, and UnitedStates v. Lopez, 315 in 1995,
all of the other cases were decided in the last three years. When you look at these
cases together, it truly is a federalism revolution. How far the Supreme Court will
go in this regard, how many laws will be invalidated, and how broadly state
sovereign immunity will be interpreted, will likely depend, as in all areas in
constitutional law, on where the next vacancy will be in the Supreme Court, and
who will make the replacements.
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